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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
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The thesis critically examines two important concepts in the discussion of public management, 
good governance, and good enough governance. It argues that current thinking about good 
governance is overly inclusive and lengthy. Good enough governance offers a more feasible 
governance strategy, but it is still results-based and neglects crucial elements in human 
development such as political and civil freedom. This thesis suggests an alternative concept for 
public management in developing countries—governance with rights-first. The alternative 
concept argues that the pursuit of effective and efficient management should be placed in a more 
humanistic frame that includes not just economic development, but also political, social, and 
civic development. Government policies should be based primarily on addressing the political, 
economic, social, and civil rights, and needs of the citizenry of the country. It also argues that 
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there is no one-size-fits-all formula to improve governance. Policy interventions must be based 
on the specific context of the country.  
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1. Introduction  
An important issue at the heart of African development is the most useful approach 
for academics as well as practitioners to understand the process of development 
administration on the ground.  In 1992, with the release of the World Bank’s Governance 
and Development report, the notion of “good governance” was born. Public sector 
management, accountability, a legal framework for development and transparency, and 
information have been initially identified as core elements of good governance. Since then, 
the concept has come to be adopted widely by the donor community as the most 
appropriate public administration strategy to address underdevelopment in developing 
countries.  
International and multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank, the 
United Nations, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) have included good governance as an 
essential part of their development agenda (Hyden, 2004). This implies a requirement in 
funding development projects that improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency 
of the implementation of policies in developing countries. These projects and programs are 
often anchored in a “results-based approach,” which essentially focuses on a time-bound 
project that links inputs to certain outcomes. Priorities are given to policies that show 
promise to produce positive results.  
Governance reform agendas of the donor community, however, are usually very 
ambitious, inclusive, lengthy, and some would say, unfeasible (Andrews, 2008; Grindle, 
2004). In an attempt to make governance reform agendas more appropriate to 
underdeveloped and largely poor countries, Marilee Grindle has offered the notion of 
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“good enough governance,” which is “a condition of minimally acceptable government 
performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and 
political development, and that permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward” 
(Grindle, 2014). While this approach is an improvement over the concept and policy 
approach to studying good governance in developing countries, it is still based on outcome 
and is a results-based approach to development rather than requiring certain rights-based 
steps first in the design of development policy.  
 The goal of the present thesis is to argue that both the concepts of good governance 
and good enough governance tend to overlook the constituents whom these approaches are 
meant to serve. In other words, they do not first consider that development administration 
is supposed to be based from the beginning on the goal of serving the public good. The 
idea is that a policy should consider its promise to achieve a specific general public good. 
In other words, government policies should be based primarily on addressing the political, 
economic, social, and civil rights, and needs of the citizenry of the country. This thesis 
argues that the pursuit of effective and efficient management should be placed in a more 
humanistic frame that includes not just economic development, but also political, social, 
and civic development.  
Assuming a comprehensive conceptualization of development, the rationale for 
achieving development objectives are as important as the ends. This thesis thus proposes a 
further improvement over the previous works on good governance and good enough 
governance and argues for a rights-based approach to public management. It is argued that 
human rights which include the right to life and liberty, freedom of opinion and expression, 
the right to work and education, and many more, are inherent to all human beings 
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regardless of race, ethnicity, or socio-economic classes. A rights-based approach to public 
management therefore aims at holding governments accountable for the protection and 
fulfilling of economic, political, social, and civil rights of the populations of the area being 
governed.  
The thesis is organized as follows: It first examines and critiques in detail the 
debates over good governance and good enough governance. Next, it makes a case for an 
improved conceptualization of good governance which is humanistically based and 
emphasizes not only administrative efficiency but also the rule of law, accountability, civic 
participation, and basic human rights. It also builds on the previous works on good enough 
governance and argues that the arrangement of governance reforms should be based on the 
cultural context and history of the country or countries being administered. In addition, it 
argues that priorities should be rights-based. The final section consists of the conclusion, 
suggestions for a new rights-based approach and directions for further research.  
2. Good Governance: Review and Critique 
2.1 Origins of the concept of Good Governance 
The concept of good governance emerged at the 1990s. It grew out of the 
limitations of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) which minimized the involvement of 
the state in leading and promoting national development, and the emerging interventionist 
role played by East Asian states in stimulating the economic growth of their countries. The 
SAPs introduced “conditionality” on the state’s macroeconomic lending activities while at 
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the same time qualifying the role of the state in the economy. 1 The state came to be seen 
more as a promoter of the free market than involved in it and as a promoter and funder of 
technological innovation. Good governance came to require that developing states recede 
from heavy economic intervention and embrace the free market. However, the SAPs did 
not foster growth and reduce poverty as anticipated. At the same time, the so-called “Asian 
Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) achieved extraordinary 
economic growth with their state-intervention models which emphasized promoting 
improvements in private and semi-private economic performance (Barbara, 1995). SAPs’ 
failure and Asian Tigers’ success brought attention back to the role of the state in 
development. Donor communities began to back-track in their requirements for their 
development assistance and to re-emphasize the legitimacy of state intervention in 
economic development, but based more on the success of Asian models.  
In the above context, the term “good governance” was used for the first time in 
1989. In his preface to the Bank study on Sub-Saharan Africa, the former World Bank 
president Barber Conable used the term “good governance,” referring to it as a “public 
service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is 
accountable to its public” (World Bank, 1989). In 1992, the Bank released a report entitled 
Governance and Development. In this publication, it defined governance as “the manner in 
which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources 
for development.” The report emphasized the role of states in providing public goods and 
services and called attention to the quality of public institutions. What was said to be 
                                                 
1 Conditionality is the use of conditions attached to the provision of benefits such as a loan, debt 
relief or bilateral aid. Doornbos, Martin R. 'Good Governance': The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?, 
Journal of Development Studies, 37:6 (2001), 93-108, DOI: 10.1080/713601084 
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needed was a more efficient, transparent, effective, accountable governance in developing 
countries. Thus, the notion of “good governance” was born and gradually became popular 
in the discourse and policies of the donor community. In 1998, former United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan even noted that “good governance is perhaps the single 
most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development (United Nations 
1998).” 
2.2 Principle and practice of the Good Governance  
Almost all major development institutions today claim that the promotion of good 
governance is an integral part of their development policy agenda, yet divergent and 
different conceptualizations characterize their governance agenda. Table 1 presents a 
sample of definitions from major developmental institutions and scholars, highlighting the 
complexity of the concept (See Table 1).  
In general, many multilateral development actors focus on the economic dimension 
of governance and tend to emphasize transparency, accountability, and formal laws related 
to this process. This and other such organizations such as the United Nations organization 
such as ILO, FAO,UNICEF  and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and some bilateral agencies such as the USAID and CIDA, highlight human rights, 
participation, democratic governance, and the rule of law, which are more relevant to the 
political and civil dimensions of governance. 
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Table 1: Working Definitions of Good Governance 
Multilateral Development Banks 
World Banks “Good governance, for the World Bank, is synonymous with sound 
development management.”  
The Bank “identifies four areas of governance that are consistent with the 
Bank's mandate: public sector management, accountability, the legal 
framework for development, and information and transparency, voice  
and accountability; stability and lack of violence; regulatory framework; 
government effectiveness; control of corruption; the rule of law.2 
African 
Development 
Bank 
Good governance should include “accountability, transparency, combating 
corruption, stakeholder participation, and enabling legal and judicial 
framework.” 3 
Asian 
Development 
Bank (ADB) 
Its ‘concept of good governance “focuses essentially on the ingredients for 
effective management.”  “It concerns norms of behavior that help ensure that 
governments actually deliver to their citizens what they say they will deliver.”  
The Bank has identified four basic elements of good governance: 
accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency.4 
International  
Monetary Fund 
 (IMF) 
“The transparency of government accounts, the effectiveness of public 
resource management, and the stability and transparency of the economic and 
regulatory environment for private sector activity.”5 
United Nations 
United Nations  The openness and accountability of institutions,  including 
Parliaments; Elections; Freedom of information; The rule of law; 
Combating corruption; Constitution-Making. 6 
United Nations  
Development  
Programme 
 (UNDP)  
Good, or democratic governance as we call it at UNDP, entails meaningful and 
inclusive political participation – basically, people are having more of a say in 
all of the decisions which shape their lives.7 
Bilateral agencies   
United States 
(USAID) 
Democratic Governance; Participation; Fair Competition; Civil Society and 
Independent Media; Justice.8 
 
                                                 
2 World Bank. Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Goverance: A World Bank Strategy. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.2000. 
 
3 African Development Bank. Governance Strategic Directions and Action Plan Gap 2008-2012, 
2008, 15. 
 
4 Asian Development Bank. Governance: Sound Economic Management, August 1995, 4.  
 
5 IMF. Good Governance: The IMF’s Role, August 1997, iv, 3. 
 
6 UN website. ‘Governance’. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/governance/good-governance/ 
 
7 UNDP. Governance for Sustainable Human Development. New York: UNDP. 1997. 
 
8 USAID. ‘Democracy and Governance’, http://www.usaid/gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/. 
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Although donor agencies have different conceptualizations of the term, in practice, 
economic, political, administrative, and human rights-related reforms often overlap in 
donors’ reform packages. As time has gone by, good governance agendas of donor 
institutions have become incredibly inclusive and lengthy. Take the World Bank’s good 
governance agenda as a pertinent example; the list of characteristics of good governance 
and the institutions, laws, policies, services, and strategies that are required to achieve it 
has grown incredibly long over time. In the 1997 World Development Report, developing 
countries were advised to pay attention to 45 aspects of good governance; by 2002, the list 
had grown to 116 items (Grindle, 2014). As Hyden points out (2004), good governance has 
essentially become a collection of all good things. As they attempted to adhere to donor 
conditionalities, developing countries had to at least appear to make great efforts to achieve 
these “good things.”  
To improve what donors consider as good governance, aid agencies also introduced 
aid conditionality into the implementation of developmental projects and programmes 
(Doornbos, 2001). Countries in need of foreign aid came to be required to alter their 
institutional structure and policy processes to meet the criteria that donors set. To further 
strengthen aid efficiency, many aid agencies developed quantitative governance indicators. 
For instance, the World Bank has developed Worldwide Governance Indicators9, the 
USAID has their Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators10, and the 
CIDA published Indicators for Programming in Human Rights and Democratic 
                                                 
9 World Bank, World Governance Indicators (WGI), https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home.  
 
10 USAID, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, 1998, 
http://www.managingforimpact.org/sites/default/files/resource/handbook_of_democracy_and_governance_pr
ogram_indicators.pdf 
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Development: A Preliminary Study11. Take USAID’s index for an example. As shown in 
table 2, general objectives such as accountability and transparency are divided into lower-
level objectives which are called intermediate results, and then these results are measured 
with detailed indicators that can track the progress quantatively. In practive, these 
indicators often came to be used to select aid recipients and to measure the progress of 
governance reforms. 
                                                 
11 CIDA, Indicators for Programming in Human Rights and Democratic Development: A Preliminary Study, 
1996. 
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Source:USAID, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, 1998, 
http://www.managingforimpact.org/sites/default/files/resource/handbook_of_democracy_and_governance_pr
ogram_indicators.pdf 
Table 2 Indicators for government transparency and accpuntability from USAID  
Objectives Intermediate Results Indicators 
More  
Transparent  
And 
Accountable 
Government  
Institutions 
Increased  
Government  
Responsiveness to  
Citizens at the  
Local Level 
Citizens in target local govt. units who feel 
that local govt. is addressing their priority 
concerns; Percentage of eligible voters voting 
in local elections; Percentage of women or 
minority elected local councilors;  
Increased Citizen  
Access to Improved  
Government 
Information 
Citizens believe they have adequate 
information on political and economic issues 
and on key aspects of government activities; 
Journalists believe that govt. is providing 
them with full opportunity to observe & 
pursue issues or other key user groups 
believe. 
Ethical Practices  
in Government  
Strengthened 
Public perceptions of corruption in the 
delivery or provision of selected govt. 
services, as reported in opinion polls; 
Time and real cost to customers of getting a 
license(s) from a selected goverment 
regulatory or licensing agency (ies). 
Strengthened  
Civil-Military  
Relations  
Supportive  
of Democracy 
Evidence of military respect for constitutional 
limits;  
Goverment budget for military;  Military 
expenditure derived from sources other than 
government;  
Ratio of civil/military expenditure in key 
functional areas; 
More Effective,  
Independent, and 
 Representative  
Legislatures 
Level of confidence among political actors or 
legislators that legislature has the capacity to 
perform its function, acts as an independent 
body, acts as a check against the executive 
and  represents their interests. 
Enhanced Policy  
Processes in the 
 Executive Branch 
Percentage of citizens who believe that the 
executive branch has transparent, 
participatory, and thoughtful policy processes; 
Key executive branch policies which appear 
to be having their intended impact in 
comparison with a list of policies supported. 
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2.3 Limitations of the concept of good governance. 
As mentioned above, donors’ requirements indicate that good governance has 
become extremely lengthy and inclusive over time. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is not 
feasible for many developing countries, especially highly indebted poor countries, to 
accomplish the task of achieving good governance. Also, the implementation of good 
governance strategies is hindered by the widespread practice of corruption in various forms 
found in most if not all developing countries. However, with the introduction of 
conditionalities, reforms came to be mandatory, even if they do not easily match with 
prevailing political cultures and configurations of power in developing countries. As a 
result, Northern developing countries often only pay lip-service to critical governance 
reforms such as civic participation. 
Besides, most aid agencies still take a results-based approach to good governance. 
At the heart of the results-based approach is a focus on a time-bound project or programme 
which essentially links inputs to specific outcomes (Wandersmana et al., 2000). The 
results-based approach has many limitations. It tends to focus mostly on outcomes and 
inputs and pays less attention to the process of reforms that donors typically have no real 
control over. Therefore, donors could not easily hold local actors accountable for the 
process of reforms in their particular countries.  
Moreover, neglecting the process of policy implementation also means 
underappreciating the importance of history and culture in developmental work. Countries 
and regions in the world have diverse culture, history, and experiences. The design of a 
proper implementation strategy would require a thorough assessment of these factors. 
Otherwise, it would increase the costs and the chances of achieving desirable outputs and 
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outcomes. Many cases could illustrate the necessity of matching project-design with 
historical and cultural context.  
Consider colonial legacy, for example. Colonial-era policies and institutions are 
thought to be related to post-independence variation in state-building and development 
(e.g., Lipset, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). In particular, British 
institutional legacies are different from those of French. British administration was based 
on the indirect rule, which favored preserving tradition and working with local authorities. 
On the contrary, French policies were focused on direct rules, which significantly reduced 
local autonomy and traditional authority (Lee and Schultz, 2012). As a result, traditional 
leaders such as chiefs were left with more authority under British rule (Geschiere, 1995). 
In addition, former British and French colonies also have a different legal system. The 
British enforced the common law system which attributes legal standing to judicial 
opinions and traditions while the French enforced the civil law system in which decisions 
are supposed to be based entirely on the codified legal text (Mamdani, 1996). The above-
mentioned differences should all be taken into account when choosing the policy-
implementation strategy. For instance, in former British colonies, developmental agencies 
that aim at increasing community-level participation could work with traditional leaders to 
accomplish the goal since chiefs have the capacity to rally the inhabitants for local 
development (Baldwin, 2016). If development agencies only consider the outcomes of 
policies and do not attach enough importance to the legal system and existing institutions, 
their policies are more likely to fail than succeed.  
History and culture also have shaped different regions’ ethnic situations. In some 
regions and countries, sub-national citizenship does not typically conflict with national 
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citizenship, but in Africa, this is not the case. African countries were left with artificial 
borders that were divided by European powers during the 19th century (Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou, 2016). However, these artificial borders split many closely related ethnic 
groups into different countries. For instance, the Afar people of Ethiopia were split 
amongst Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, and the Anyuaa and Nuer were split between 
Ethiopia and South Sudan (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007). The artificial 
border design and the partitioning of ethnic groups often led to a tension between ethnicity 
and nationality on the continent. When development agencies address issues involving 
ethnicity and citizenship, they must understand the complex history that the continent has, 
and address related issues from a historical perspective. The effect and the outcome of their 
policies cannot be possibily guaranteed without paying attention to the region’s unique 
history and culture.  
Furthermore, this approach tends to measure outcomes almost exclusively with 
quantitative indicators. However, some of good governance’s most important goals cannot 
be easily measured. For instance, aid agencies can easily calculate the number of citizens 
that have participated in the local decision-making process, but to what extent the poor, the 
illiterate or the marginalized people’s opinion matters cannot be easily measured with the 
numbers and statistics of the indexes mentioned above. Last but not least, building good 
governance takes time in societies where institutions are weak. The culture of the political 
economies varies from country to country. Therefore the expectation of results within set 
timelines is not realistic in many places.  
To sum up, although the concept is favored by many donors, the usefulness of good 
governance as a guideline for governance reforms in developing countries is limited. The 
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concept has become a collection of all kinds of “good” things, but there is little discussion 
about whether the good things fit together in a doable and meaningful way. At the same 
time, most aid agencies take a results-based approach to good governance. The results-
based approach tends to focus attention more on the output and less on the process of 
reform, which is equally important in development. Moreover, good governance thinking 
is still based on a one-size-fits-all philosophy, which fails to acknowledge the context in 
most countries adequately and therefore, can easily lead to disappointment.  
3. Good Enough Governance: Review and Critique 
3.1 Contents of the concept  
In an effort to make good governance more realistic and feasible, Grindle offered 
an alternative concept which she labeled as “good enough governance.”  Good enough 
governance is “a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil 
society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development, 
and that permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward” (Grindle, 2004).  
Grindle argues that all the institutions and policies for good governance do not 
happen overnight. The current agenda of good governance is too overwhelming for 
developing countries to implement according to the letter. Therefore, policies and 
interventions should be assessed in the light of feasibility, historical evidence, sequence, 
and timing, and they should be selected carefully in terms of their contributions to 
particular ends such as economic growth or poverty reduction.  
Grindle highlights the importance of the context of governance interventions and 
their content. She adopts Mick Moore’s typology of political systems and classifies states 
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into collapsed states, personal rule states, minimally institutionalized states, 
institutionalized non-competitive states, and institutionalized competitive states (Moore, 
1998). As shown in Table 3, Grindle has arranged the priorities of governance reforms 
according to the type of the states.  
Table 3 Arrangement of governance priorities in different political systems 
 
Governance 
characteristics 
Collapsed 
states 
Personal 
rule 
Minimally 
institutionalized 
states 
Institutionalized 
non-competitive 
states 
Institutionalized 
competitive 
states 
Personal safety ensured Priority Priority    
Basic conflict resolution 
systems in place and 
functioning 
Priority Priority Priority   
Widespread agreement on 
basic rules of the game 
for political succession 
 Priority Priority   
Government able to carry 
out basic administrative 
tasks 
 Priority Priority   
Government able to 
ensure basic services to 
most of the population 
  Priority Priority Priority 
Government able to 
ensure equality/fairness 
in justice and access to 
services 
   Priority Priority 
Open government 
decision-making, 
implementation processes 
   Priority Priority 
Government responsive 
to input from organized 
groups, citizen 
participation 
   Priority Priority 
Government fully 
accountable for its 
decisions and their 
consequences 
    Priority 
Source: Grindle, Merilee S. “Good Enough Governance Revisited.” Development Policy Review (2007), 
533–574. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007.00385. 
 
According to Grindle’s arrangements, restoring peace, order, and government 
functionality are the priorities in poorly or less institutionalized countries. Some important 
agendas in good governance, such as equal access to services, transparency, 
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responsiveness, and accountability, are expected to be less relevant and feasible in these 
countries.  
3.2 Practice and limitations of the concept of Good Governance 
Grindle’s conceptualization offers an improvement over the original 
conceptualization of good governance. It reduces the long list of institutional changes and 
capacity-building initiatives currently deemed essential for development and requires 
minimal conditions of governance necessary for political and economic development to 
occur. In recent years many donor organizations have in practice followed Grindle’s line of 
thinking and adopted the notion of good enough governance. Post-genocide Rwanda 
represents one of the most pertinent cases on this issue.  
Rwanda has been a highly-favored aid recipient after the genocide. The US, the 
UK, and the World Bank have been Rwanda’s top three donors in past decades. Over the 
last ten years, annual funding from USAID alone has increased from about $48 million in 
2004 to over $128 million in 2016 (USAID, 2018). Donors have assisted Rwanda on post-
conflict reconstruction in a variety of ways – from rebuilding justice and health systems to 
reconstructing physical infrastructure and reducing poverty. With the support of donors 
like the US, the UK, and the World Bank, Rwanda has made remarkable achievements in 
respect of growth, good public provision, gender equality, and poverty reduction.  
At the same time, there are increasing criticisms pointing to the country’s poor 
performance in international measures of human rights compliance and political freedoms. 
For instance, Rwanda’s ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), has built 
thousands of Gacaca courts—deriving their name from the Kinyarwanda word meaning 
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“grass” (the place where communities gather to resolve disputes)—to try hundreds of 
thousands of genocide-related cases (Webster, 2011). The courts are criticized for opening 
the floodgates to false genocide accusations and to attributing collective guilt on the Hutu 
majority (Brehm, Uggen and Gasanabo, 2014). The government is also accused of 
suppressing free speech, repressing political dissent, and stifling independent civil society 
in the country. The regime stands accused by the UN of promoting war in eastern Congo 
(Reyntjens, 2011).  
The regime’s unsatisfying human rights record has not prevented it from receiving 
foreign aid, however. Donors have publicly voiced concerns over Rwanda’s human rights 
record, but they did not mount any coordinated or sustained effort. Overall, aid flows were 
not impacted. The UK suspended budget support to Rwanda in 2012 but resumed aid in 
later years. The US cut only military aid, and the World Bank has not yet taken any actions 
to pressure Rwanda.  
Although donors claim that aid is carefully and precisely earmarked for 
programmes that will support Rwanda’s most vulnerable people, there is still the risk that 
aid has helped to consolidate the control of RPF and indirectly sponsored human rights 
violations in Rwanda. This concern is especially legitimate since the government of 
Rwanda did not significantly change course even with donor’s criticism. Gacaca courts 
have continued operation even as concerns over due process remained unresolved. 
Suppression of a free press, free speech, political dissent, and civil society has persisted for 
decades, and there is little sign of improvement.  
The case of Rwanda reveals the limitations of good enough governance. Post-
genocide Rwanda is either a collapsed state or state under personal rule according to the 
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political system typology that Grindle uses. Considering the feasibility and efficiency of 
development programmes, she argues that interventions to enhance governments’ 
functioning and reduce poverty should precede other kinds of reforms such as justice and 
government’s accountability in countries like Rwanda. However, such an arrangement 
implies that economic growth is the single most important goal in development for 
underdeveloped countries. As such, it chooses to ignore the importance of many other 
elements in development such as freedom of speech and civil rights and allow for violation 
of other components of human development.  
Grindle’s approach reflects a one-sided understanding of development. Economic 
growth means an increase in real national income, but not necessarily in the quality of life 
and living standards, e.g., measures of literacy, life expectancy, and health care. We would 
expect economic growth to create a base for economic and human development, but the 
link is not guaranteed. The proceeds of economic growth can be wasted or retained by a 
small wealthy elite.  
Moreover, in the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), the status of human development was analyzed, considering 
all its diverse aspects and sets of objectives. Even though the economic quality of life of 
citizens is thought to be necessary, political, social, and civil rights have been given equal 
importance to human development. Therefore in the development of a governance strategy, 
the protection of citizens’ political, social, and civil rights should be considered together 
with citizens’ economic rights. Governments should be held accountable for the 
comprehensive rights of the populations of the area being governed.  
18 
 
Overall, comparing to good governance, the concept of good enough governance 
makes a step in the right direction to target fewer, more useful, and more feasible 
interventions. Nevertheless, it is essentially a result-based and therefore arguably value-
free approach. It priorities economic growth and poverty reduction while allowing 
violations of other components of human development, such as political liberty of 
participation, protective security, and freedom of speech. In a broader view of 
development, such an arrangement of priorities is problematic. The liberty of political 
participation or the opportunity to receive basic education or health care are among the 
constituent components of development and should be protected by governments as well.  
4. The need for a “Rights first” approach to development policymaking 
Based on the shortcomings of the concepts of good governance and good enough 
governance identified thus far, this thesis suggests an alternative concept for public 
management in developing countries, which is governance with rights first. This concept 
starts with Amartya Sen’s concept of  “development as freedom.” The idea is that 
development is a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy (Sen, 2013; 
chapter 1). Freedoms are the primary ends of development. In contrasts with other 
approaches which identify development with the growth of GNP, rise in personal incomes, 
industrialization, or social modernization, Sen argues that these are means to remove 
unfreedom but they are not the ultimate ends that we pursue (2013; chapter 2).  
Sen further argues that freedoms are not only the ends of development; they are 
also among its principal means. Political freedoms, economic facilities, social 
opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security are all crucial instrumental 
freedoms. These different kinds of freedom help to increase personal capabilities and 
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human agencies in all aspects of life. They interrelate with one another, and freedom of 
one type may greatly help in advancing freedom of other types (Sen, 2013; chapter 2).  
To achieve such comprehensive goals of development, this thesis argues for a 
rights-based approach to governance which acknowledges human freedom as an intrinsic 
human right and good governance would require the protection and promotion of this 
freedom as fundamental (Cornwall and Nyamu‐Musembi, 2004). Compared to the results-
based approach to development which seeks for additional resources for protecting human 
rights, a rights-based approach insists that government should allocate existing resources 
more equally and ensure marginalized people’s rights to those resources (?).  
Meanwhile, unlike the concept of good governance which encourages the “one best 
way” thinking about what needs to be done to improve public sector performance in 
developing countries, the thesis builds on the previous works of good enough governance 
and argues that the arrangement of governance reforms should be based on the cultural 
context and history of the country or countries being administered. Formal solutions to 
governance problems should be designed with regard to their situational fit or impact. 
4.1 Development as freedom 
Governance reforms aim at achieving development through enhancing the public 
sector’s performance. Therefore the discussion of effective public management strategy 
should start by asking what is development? This thesis contends that Amartya Sen’s view 
of development as freedom would significantly improve current thinking about the end that 
public sector management intends to achieve.  
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As Sen argues, freedom is the main object of development, and development is a 
process of expanding the real freedom that people enjoy (Sen, 1999; ch.1).  Economic 
opportunities, political freedoms, social facilities, transparency guarantees, and protective 
security are all among the crucial components of development. As such, real development 
cannot be reduced to simply increasing basic incomes, nor to rising average per capita 
incomes. Instead, it requires a package of overlapping mechanisms that progressively 
enable the exercise of a growing range of freedoms.  
In comparison, Grindle’s approach reflects a much narrower view of development. 
Grindle identifies economic growth and poverty elimination as the main object of 
development and therefore, does not pay equal attention to the issue of deprivation of 
political freedom and civil rights in less-institutionalized countries. The underlying 
assumption for this argument is that if poor people are given the choice between having 
political freedoms and fulfilling economic needs, they will invariably choose the latter.   
However, as Sen has nicely put it, the removal of political and civil unfreedom 
does not contradict poverty alleviation (Sen, 1999; chapter 6). Moreover, the fulfilling of 
economic needs itself may require the exercise of political and civil rights. Political and 
civil rights, especially those related to the guaranteeing of open discussion, debate, 
criticism, and dissent, are central to the processes of generating informed and reflected 
economic choices. Political and civil freedom are not barriers to economic development. 
Instead, they play a vital role in providing incentives and information in the solution of 
acute economic needs. Therefore the expansion of citizens’ political and civil freedom 
should not be sacrificed for the pursuit of equitable economic freedom.   
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To sum up, this thesis agrees with Sen’s freedom-centralized understanding of 
development and argues that economic, political, social, and civil rights must all be 
integrated into the process of expanding human freedom broadly conceived.  
4.2 The rights-based approach to governance  
On the basis of a comprehensive understanding of development, this thesis argues 
for a rights-based approach to governance which acknowledges human freedoms as 
intrinsic human rights and calls for the protection and promotion of this freedom as 
fundamental government responsibilities.  
In a rights-based approach, rights are defined as entitlements that are inherent to all 
human beings regardless of race, ethnicity, or socio-economic class (United Nations, 
2015).   Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and 
torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many 
more.  Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination. All humans, therefore, 
would be constructed as rights holders, and the holders’ government is obligated to fulfill 
the holders' rights as their primary duty bearer. By integrating the rights-based approach to 
public management, this thesis argues that effective public management should aim at 
strengthening capacity of duty bearers to provide rights holders with their entitled 
economic, political, social, and civil rights.  
In contrast to a results-based approach which mostly focuses on the outputs and 
outcomes of specific programs and gives priorities to programs that promise to reduce 
positive results, a rights-based approach argues the outcomes of development projects and 
programs are not the ultimate basis for the assessment of these programs. The means and 
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the process to achieve outcomes are as important as the ends, and the rightness of the ends 
does not justify the wrongness of means.  
Rwanda’s recent development presents a pertinent case for us to reflect on the 
relative importance of ends and means. After the genocide, the ruling party of Rwanda has 
aimed at transforming Rwanda from a low human development country to a medium 
human development country, and Rwanda has indeed made impressive progress in 
economic growth, health, nutrition, education, and human capital. However, even though it 
seems that the Rwanda government is working towards the right direction on development, 
the process and the way that Rwanda government accomplishes their objectives entails 
substantial coercion and human rights violation.  
One of the ruling party’s top priorities is modernizing the country. In order to 
accomplish this goal rapidly, the government tries to impose rapid modernity among 
tradition-bound rural communities. Villagers are obligated to wear shoes, to be clean, use 
mosquito nets, adhere to the health insurance guidelines, wear school uniforms, construct 
toilets, make compost pits and dry dishes on tables instead of on the grass (Twizeyimana, 
2006). People have reported that on arriving at the market without shoes, local authorities 
took their food money to buy them shoes (Ansoms, 2011). This coercive behavior on the 
part of the government does provide the pressure to adopt modern practices but at the 
expense of a willful decision on the part of those who are being asked/forced to make those 
changes independently.  
Those policies might improve Rwanda’s score on donor’s measurement on social 
well-being since rural villages would appear to be more modern, however, as some 
researchers pointed out, RPF has arbitrarily reshaped the rural landscape without paying 
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attention to what rural dwellers are doing and want to do (Newburry, 2011; Hilhorst and 
Leeuwen, 1999). Policies are designed at the national level without consulting the diverse 
constituencies, including rural villagers. Local authorities are mere implementers of 
national strategies without much ability to translate or reinterpret these strategies for local 
contexts.  
A similar policy-making and implementation strategy can be found in many other 
programs in Rwanda. The crop specialization program is another example. This program is 
designed to commercialize production and encourage regional specialization in crops that 
grow best in particular regions. In practice, the government has regulated what rural 
producers can grow in some regions of the country, when they should plant, and how they 
should market their crops. However, this program is resented by some rural dwellers 
because of the threat to their food security and the harsh penalties for noncompliance 
(Ansoms, 2009). 
The case of Rwanda shows the danger of focusing too much on targets and not on 
the means and process. Although policy-makers might argue that government has better 
judgment for what is supposed to be suitable for their people, the truth is they do not spend 
enough effort to know the need and “the will” of their constituencies during the process of 
policy-making and implementation. As James Scott has reminded us in Seeing Like a State, 
those who reshape the rural landscape without paying attention to what rural dwellers are 
doing and want to do—and the complex ways in which they have adapted to harsh, 
insecure environments—are likely to meet with resistance and failure. Outcomes of their 
projects would be likely to differ from announced goals (1999).  
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Moreover, even if these policies might lead to some desirable outcomes, the 
process of achieving such results violates the nature of development. This thesis 
recognized the limitations of a results-based approach and therefore called for a rights-
based approach to governance. Governments are expected to take a participatory approach 
to policy-making, one that would have encouraged broad-based participation and given 
real voices to the concerns of diverse constituencies, including the poor, the marginalized, 
and other disadvantaged groups. The process to arrive at the desired result is as important 
as the result itself.   
4.3 The contextual fit of governance strategies 
The concept of governance with rights-first builds on previous work of good 
enough governance and argues that the arrangement of governance reforms should be 
based on specific contexts. As Grindle has pointed out, countries differ in their histories, 
institutions, experiences, and conditions, and the challenges they face and the workability 
of different interventions to deal with these challenges will necessarily differ (Grindle, 
2011). The “one-size-fits-all” thinking would most likely fail to acknowledge the context 
and lead to disappointing results.  
In different contexts, the challenges for establishing effective public management 
will be different. Therefore the priorities of the reforms should be arranged accordingly. 
Take two neighboring countries, Uganda and Rwanda for example. The government of 
Rwanda has managed to provide their communities with the basic services they need, but 
the challenge Rwanda faces is their top-down and authoritarian power structure. As for 
Uganda, government agencies are not providing their communities with the basic services 
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they need. Uganda has been imperiled by a lack of accountability, cumbersome systems, 
and corruption.  
In Rwanda, there are mechanisms to provide some level of accountability. 
Rwandan government officials all have key performance indicators (KPIs) within their 
staff performance contracts. Progress is regularly measured by performance evaluations, 
and those who cannot meet their performance goals face the risk of leaving office 
(Ingelaere, 2014). As a result, government officials are kept accountable, although the 
main direction of accountability is upwards.  
The drawbacks with Rwanda’s governance system is that government officials 
might pay major attention to their KPIs instead of the well-being of their community.  
KPIs sometimes reflect the level of citizens’ well-being, but not always. For instance, the 
increase in crop production might show that farmers have a good harvest. However, a 
larger harvest does not necessarily translate into higher income. Farmers might face a 
dramatic drop in the market prices of their crops and thus have less income. Under 
Rwanda’s current structure, government officials might force farmers to increase yields in 
order to complete their KPI.  
 Compared with Rwanda, Uganda faces different challenges in governance. Uganda 
has a highly decentralized local government system. District governments are responsible 
for providing vital public services, such as healthcare and education (Green, 2001). 
However, the government of Uganda has failed to keep government officials accountable. 
Corruption has proliferated at almost all public institutions, from grand-scale theft of 
public funds to petty corruption involving public officials at all levels of society (Devas 
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and Grant, 2013). The wide-spread corruption has largely impaired governments’ capacity 
to provide public goods, leading to under-provision and low quality of services. 
The problem with Uganda’s government structure is that corruption is 
institutionalized, and there exist too few channels for holding governments accountable to 
their constituents. The push for money in the party and parliamentary politics in Uganda is 
well known. The ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), has allowed 
elites to benefit personally from corruption in order to retain their loyalty and keep them 
within the ruling coalition (Roger and Mwenda, 2008).  
Ugandan Members of Parliament (MPs) are to a large degree in debt because of the 
costs of running the campaigns, convincing electorates and building alliances during 
elections, and they expect to get the opportunity to reclaim this money and more after 
elections, through corruptive means (Asea, 2017; Uneke 2010). Political parties and 
politicians also put pressure on companies to finance their campaigns, and bribes are used 
to secure the support of certain political parties and politicians. Judicial and other 
government supervisory agencies have often fallen victim to bribery. According to the 2012 
Afrobarometer survey, 19% of respondents reported having been offered money or a gift in 
return for their vote during the 2011 elections in Uganda (Maira 2013).  
According to Human Right Watch, even though Uganda has established an 
impressive array of anti-corruption institutions, high-ranking government officials, 
ministers, or political appointees usually do not serve prison sentences despite 
investigations into numerous corruption scandals over many years. Instead, activists who 
fight corruption face arrest and criminal charges. For instance, in Uganda, there is a 
coalition of civil society groups known as the Black Monday Movement. The group raises 
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grassroots awareness and protests corruption by wearing black on Mondays and handing 
out newsletters with information about graft in various sectors. In 2013, police thwarted 
attempts to distribute information and arrested the founder of Black Monday Movement 
along with nine students, charging them with a range of crimes, from “spreading of 
harmful propaganda” to “inciting violence” and “possession of prohibited publications” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013).  
Given the challenges that Rwanda and Uganda face, policy interventions should 
have different focuses. In Rwanda, government and development agencies need to work on 
expanding broad-based participation and increasing the usefulness of government’s 
agendas so that they serve the ultimate interest of the public. While in Uganda, 
governments need to fight corruption at all levels of the administration and political 
domain. Since Uganda already has many anti-corruption laws and institutions in place, 
what Uganda needs more might be strong political leadership will for combating 
corruption. Besides, civil society also has vital roles to play in fighting corruption. Civil 
society can monitor public services provision, demand accountability and denounce 
bribery, and raise awareness of all socio-economic and political actors (Asea, 2018).  
Improving governance is a complex process, and there is no one-size-fits-all 
formula. Although the goals are to make government more effective, accountable, 
transparent, participatory, and more protective of citizen’s political, economic and civil 
rights, each country has different challenges to overcome, and the solutions would 
certainly differ given each country’s history, institutions, and experiences. Even for 
countries with similar problems, policy interventions should also be assessed carefully 
based on the country’ unique situation.  
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5. Conclusion 
Governance is a critical issue that the development community needs to continue to 
address.  The concept of good governance contributes to this conversation in drawing 
people’s attention to the performance of the public sector in development, but it 
excessively relies on standardized approaches and best practices transplanted from the 
developed world and generates few perspectives rooted in local realities. Besides, it calls 
for improvements in virtually all aspects of the public sector and therefore leads to an 
impossibly inflated idea of what public sectors need to do in the short run. But the long list 
may be beyond what is actually needed or feasible. The lack of local perspective and the 
overloaded agendas has limited the capacity of donors and developing countries to evaluate 
the relative importance of various components of governance and to identify the real 
governance challenges that need to be addressed.  
The concept of good enough governance is no doubt a step in the right direction to 
make governance agendas more feasible and doable. It suggests that not all governance 
deficits can be tackled at once. Therefore the emphasis should be on the minimal 
conditions of governance that are necessary to allow development. This implies that 
interventions need to be prioritized and made relevant to contextual realities, which is a 
significant improvement over the original concept. However, good enough governance 
takes a results-based approach to development and tends to prioritize economic 
development and overlook development in other areas. As such, it even allows for possible 
violations of crucial components of human rights in the process of pursuing good 
governance.   
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To provide a further improvement over the concept of good enough governance, 
this thesis builds on Sen’s definition of development as freedom and argues for a 
comprehensive understanding toward development which value the the political, 
economic, social, and civil rights of the citizenry of the country. On that basis, this thesis 
further proposes that the development community should take a rights-based approach to 
governance which acknowledges human freedoms as intrinsic human rights and calls for 
the protection and promotion of this freedom as fundamental government responsibilities. 
A rights-based approach insists that government should allocate existing resources more 
equally and ensure the marginalized people’s rights to those resources even when resources 
are limited.  
This thesis also argues that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions that can lead to 
competence and effectiveness in the public sector. Prescriptions from the developed world 
do not necessarily fit into the context of developing countries. Each country is different in 
its history, culture, political structure, economic background, and many other experiences. 
These factors have shaped the challenges and constraints that each country faces. Policy 
interventions must first take into consideration the country-specific constraints and 
challenges and then develop country-specific strategies to address such constraints.  
For future research and developmental work, development thinking should avoid 
the one-size-fits-all approach to public sector reforms and encourage exploring multiple 
paths to ideal institutional performance. Development institutions need to develop a solid 
understanding of domestic dynamics at work and tailor interventions accordingly. At the 
same time, development agencies need to recognize the long-term nature of promoting 
development and be realistic about what is feasible. Instead of chasing ambitious goals in a 
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short amount of time, developing countries and development institutions need to have 
long-term planning and take one step at a time in projects design and implementation.  
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